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Five major areas which trigger privacy matters in the area of public sector employment

Additional information on privacy issues and detailing the results of an informal survey of commercial security officers is provided in the two chapter appendixes.

Organizations and people that use computers can describe their needs for information security and trust in systems in terms of three major requirements: These three requirements may be emphasized differently in various applications. For a national defense system, the chief concern may be ensuring the confidentiality of classified information, whereas a funds transfer system may require strong integrity controls.

The requirements for applications that are connected to external systems will differ from those for applications without such interconnection.

Thus the specific requirements and controls for information security can vary. Page 50 Share Cite Suggested Citation: Safe Computing in the Information Age. The National Academies Press. A security policy is a concise statement, by those responsible for a system e. One can implement that policy by taking specific actions guided by management control principles and utilizing specific security standards, procedures, and mechanisms. Conversely, the selection of standards, procedures, and mechanisms should be guided by policy to be most effective.

To be useful, a security policy must not only state the security need e. Without this second part, a security policy is so general as to be useless although the second part may be realized through procedures and standards set to implement the policy.

In any particular circumstance, some threats are more probable than others, and a prudent policy setter must assess the threats, assign a level of concern to each, and state a policy in terms of which threats are to be resisted. For example, until recently most policies for security did not require that security five major areas which trigger privacy matters in the area of public sector employment be met in the face of a virus attack, because that form of attack was uncommon and not widely understood.

As viruses have escalated from a hypothetical to a commonplace threat, it has become necessary to rethink such policies in regard to methods of distribution and acquisition of software. Implicit in this process is management's choice of a level of residual risk that it will live with, a level that varies among organizations. Management controls are the mechanisms and techniques—administrative, procedural, and technical—that are instituted to implement a security policy.

Some management controls are explicitly concerned with protecting information and information systems, but the concept of management controls includes much more than a computer's specific role in enforcing security.

Note that management controls not only are used by managers, but also may be exercised by users. An effective program of management controls is needed to cover all aspects of information security, including physical security, classification of information, the means of recovering from breaches of security, and above all training to instill awareness and acceptance by people.

There are trade-offs among controls. For example, if technical controls are not available, then procedural controls might be used until a technical solution is found. Technical measures alone cannot prevent violations of the trust people place in individuals, violations that have been the source of Page 51 Share Cite Suggested Citation: Technical measures may prevent people from doing unauthorized things but cannot prevent them from doing things that their job functions entitle them to do.

  1. Report v skills for improved productivity, employment growth and development.
  2. The value of privacy in the workplace there are five major areas which trigger privacy matters in the area of public sector employment.
  3. For example, until recently most policies for security did not require that security needs be met in the face of a virus attack, because that form of attack was uncommon and not widely understood. A brief history of government involvement in the american they also fought corruption in the public sector a brief history of government involvement in.

Thus, to prevent violations of trust rather than just repair the damage that results, one must depend primarily on human awareness of what other human beings in an organization are doing. But even a technically sound system with informed and watchful management and users cannot be free of all possible vulnerabilities.

  • The value of privacy in the workplace there are five major areas which trigger privacy matters in the area of public sector employment;
  • Management has a duty to preserve and protect assets and to maintain the quality of service.

The residual risk must be managed by auditing, backup, and recovery procedures supported by general alertness and creative responses. Moreover, an organization must have administrative procedures in place to bring peculiar actions to the attention of someone who can legitimately inquire into the appropriateness of such actions, and that person must actually make the inquiry. In many organizations, these administrative provisions are far less satisfactory than are the technical provisions for security.

A major conclusion of this report is that the lack of a clear articulation of security policy for general computing is a major impediment to improved security in computer systems. Although the Department of Defense DOD has articulated its requirements for controls to ensure confidentiality, there is no articulation for systems based on other requirements and management controls discussed below —individual accountability, separation of duty, auditability, and recovery.

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  • One of the most interesting, yet controversial, areas concerning public personnel is employee privacy;
  • The integrity of control programs and configuration records, however, is critical;
  • Medical records, for example, may require more careful protection than does most proprietary information.

This committee's goal of developing a set of Generally Accepted System Security Principles, GSSP, is intended to address this deficiency and is a central recommendation of this report. In computing there is no generally accepted body of prudent practice analogous to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles promulgated by the Financial Auditing Standards Board see Appendix D. Managers who have never seen adequate controls for computer systems may not appreciate the capabilities currently available to them, or the risks they are taking by operating without these controls.

Faced with demands for more output, they have had no incentive to spend money on controls. Reasoning like the following is common: However, computers are active entities, and programs can be changed in a twinkling, so that past happiness is no predictor of future bliss.

There has to be only one Internet worm incident to signal a larger problem. Experience since the Internet worm involving copy-cat and derivative attacks shows how a possibility once demonstrated can become an actuality frequently used. A recent informal survey conducted on behalf of the committee shows a widespread desire among corporate system managers and security officers for the ability to identify users and limit times and places of access, particularly over networks, and to watch for intrusion by recording attempts at invalid actions see Chapter Appendix 2.

Ad hoc virus checkers, well known in the personal computer market, are also in demand. However, there is little demand for system managers to be able to obtain positive confirmation that the software running on their systems today is the same as what was running yesterday. Such a simple analog of hardware diagnostics should be a fundamental requirement; it five major areas which trigger privacy matters in the area of public sector employment not be seen as such because vendors do not offer it or because users have difficulty expressing their needs.

Although threats and policies for addressing them are different for different applications, they nevertheless have much in common, and the general systems on which applications are built are often the same.

Furthermore, basic security services can work against many threats and support many policies. Thus there is a large core of policies and services on which most of the users of computers should be able to agree.

On this basis the committee proposes the effort to define and articulate GSSP. For example, the adverse effects of a system not being available must be related in part to requirements for recovery time. A system that must be restored within an hour after disruption represents, and requires, a more demanding set of policies and controls than does a similar system that need not be restored for two to three days. Likewise, the risk of loss of confidentiality with respect to a major product announcement will change with time.

Early disclosure may jeopardize competitive advantage, but disclosure just before the intended announcement may be insignificant. In this case the information remains the same, while the timing of its release significantly affects the risk of loss. Confidentiality Confidentiality is a requirement whose purpose is to keep sensitive information from being disclosed to unauthorized recipients. The most fully developed policies for confidentiality reflect the concerns of the U.

Since the scope of threat is very broad in this context, the policy requires systems to be robust in the face of a wide variety of attacks. The specific DOD policies for ensuring confidentiality do not explicitly itemize the range of expected threats for which a policy must hold. Instead, they reflect an operational approach, expressing the policy by stating the particular management controls that must be used to achieve the requirement for confidentiality.

Thus they avoid listing threats, which would represent a severe risk in itself, and avoid the risk of poor security design implicit in taking a fresh approach to each new problem. The operational controls that the military has developed in support of this requirement involve automated mechanisms for handling information that is critical to national security.

Within each level and compartment, a person with an appropriate clearance must also have a "need to know" in order to gain access. These procedures are mandatory: Some commercial firms, for instance, classify information as restricted, company confidential, and unclassified Schmitt, 1990.

Even if an organization has no secrets of its own, it may be obliged by law or common courtesy five major areas which trigger privacy matters in the area of public sector employment preserve the privacy of information about individuals. Medical records, for example, may require more careful protection than does most proprietary information. A hospital must thus select a suitable confidentiality policy to uphold its fiduciary responsibility with respect to patient records.

In the commercial world confidentiality is customarily guarded by security mechanisms that are less stringent than those of the national security community. For example, information is assigned to an "owner" or guardianwho controls access to it. With Trojan horse attacks, for example, even legitimate and honest users of an owner mechanism can be tricked into disclosing secret data.

The commercial world has borne these vulnerabilities in exchange for the greater operational flexibility and system performance currently associated with relatively weak security. Integrity Integrity is a requirement meant to ensure that information and programs are changed only in a specified and authorized manner. It may be important to keep data consistent as in double-entry bookkeeping or to allow data to be changed only in an approved manner as in withdrawals from a bank account.

It may also be necessary to specify the degree of the accuracy of data. Some policies for ensuring integrity reflect a concern for preventing fraud and are stated in terms of management controls. For example, any task involving the potential for fraud must be divided into parts that are performed by separate people, an approach called separation of duty. A classic example is a purchasing system, which has three parts: Someone must sign off on each step, the same person cannot sign off on two steps, and the records can be changed only by fixed procedures—for example, an account is debited and a check written only for the amount of an approved and received order.

  1. Protection of privacy is important, but not critically so.
  2. The most fully developed policies for confidentiality reflect the concerns of the U. Thus, to prevent violations of trust rather than just repair the damage that results, one must depend primarily on human awareness of what other human beings in an organization are doing.
  3. It may also be necessary to specify the degree of the accuracy of data.
  4. Lexis practice advisor canada gives you access to on a wide range of employment matters area of practice encompasses all areas of labour. There are five major areas which trigger privacy matters in the in the area of public sector employment.

In this case, although the policy is stated operationally—that is, in terms of specific management controls—the threat model is explicitly disclosed as well. Other integrity policies reflect concerns for preventing errors and omissions, and controlling the effects of program change. Integrity policies have not been studied as carefully as confidentiality policies. Computer measures that have been installed to guard integrity tend to be ad hoc and do not flow from the integrity models that have been proposed see Chapter 3.

Availability Availability is a requirement intended to ensure that systems work promptly and service is not denied to authorized users. From a security standpoint, it represents the ability to protect against and recover from a damaging event. The availability of properly functioning computer systems e. Contingency planning is concerned with assessing risks and developing plans for averting or recovering from adverse events that might render a system unavailable.

  • A brief history of government involvement in the american they also fought corruption in the public sector a brief history of government involvement in;
  • Additional information on privacy issues and detailing the results of an informal survey of commercial security officers is provided in the two chapter appendixes;
  • Even if an organization has no secrets of its own, it may be obliged by law or common courtesy to preserve the privacy of information about individuals;
  • The residual risk must be managed by auditing, backup, and recovery procedures supported by general alertness and creative responses;
  • For example, a simple availability policy is usually stated like this:

Traditional contingency planning to ensure availability usually includes responses only to acts of God e. However, contingency planning must also involve providing for responses to malicious acts, not simply acts of God or accidents, and as such must include an explicit assessment of threat based on a model of a real adversary, not on a probabilistic model of nature.

For example, a simple availability policy is usually stated like this: This policy means that the up time at each terminal, averaged over all the terminals, must be at least 99. A security policy to ensure availability usually takes a different form, as in the following example: Instead, it identifies a particular threat, a malicious or incompetent act by a regular user of the system, and requires the system to survive this act.

It says nothing about other ways in which a hostile party could deny service, for example, by cutting a telephone line; a separate assertion is required for each such threat, indicating the extent to which resistance to that threat is deemed important. Examples of Security Requirements for Different Applications The exact security needs of systems will vary from application to application even within a single application. As a result, organizations must both understand their applications and think through the relevant choices to achieve the appropriate level of security.

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An automated teller system, for example, must keep personal identification numbers PINs confidential, both in the host system and during transmission for a transaction. It must protect the integrity of account records and of individual transactions.

Protection of privacy is important, but not critically so. Availability of the host system is important to the economic survival of the bank, although not to its fiduciary responsibility.